


Policing Challenges and Opportunities in Post-Conflict Swat : Needs of Women, Children and Minorities



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Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
CIIT	COMSATS Institute of Information Technology
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DC	Deputy Commissioner
DG	Director General
DIG	Deputy Inspector General
DPO	District Police Officer
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
FIR	First Information Report
GoKP	Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
HH	Household
HUJRA	Holistic Understanding for Justified Research and Action
IGP	Inspector General of Police
INGOs	International Non – Governmental Organizations
KII	Key Informant Interview
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
MNA	Member of National Assembly
MPA	Member of Provincial Assembly
NGOs	Non – Governmental Organizations
PATA	Provincially Administered Tribal Areas
SHO	Station House Officer
TNSM	Tehrik Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi
TTP	Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
WHO	World Health Organization
VIP	Very Important Person
WHO	World Health Organization

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Foreword

Pakistan faces diverse security and development challenges. The rise of militancy and intensification of conflict in multiple contexts and geographic locations has meant that internal security has become center stage in Pakistan. Both the army and police are actively involved in on-the-ground issues faced by people and communities in the wake of right wing militant violence. Various types of policy measures ranging from community policing to local peace lashkars and committees as well as strengthening and incentivizing the police and army personnel have been proposed and implemented. However, by and large, people continue to feel vulnerable in the face of continuous attacks on mosques, churches, schools, and government offices and public places.

The people of Swat witnessed intense conflict and uncertainty in 2007-09 when the Taliban took over, imposed the Nizam e Adl regulation, and later were ousted by the Pakistan military. From being a relatively peaceful and tourist friendly place, Swat turned into a massive killing field during this time when systematic destruction and denial of fundamental rights became the norm. The police was specifically targeted so that people would lose faith both in the police and the state's ability to protect them as citizens. Restoring confidence in the police force and ensuring that people's lives and properties are protected in accordance with the law constitutes the biggest challenge that state institutions have confronted in Swat.

This report brings together many ideas that have been discussed for some time in Pakistan but that few have put together systematically. Specifically, the relationship between individual and collective security, starting from the home to the community with a inclusive lens on vulnerable groups has been addressed succinctly. The report contains compelling recommendations that entail major efforts for effective implementation of police reform, greater investment in police training as well as greater awareness and internalization of human rights and women's rights instruments and their implementation. Many of the recommendations for improving police-community relations are actionable and if implemented in Swat, these could serve as a model for others to follow. As such, this report can be considered part of a blueprint for community policing in post conflict areas in Pakistan and elsewhere.

While the challenges of community policing remain a reality on the ground, one hopes that this report will receive the attention of people and policymakers in Pakistan to bring about the changes needed to move toward greater security for all Pakistani citizens, irrespective of class, gender, caste, and religion. By giving voice to people whose voices are usually eclipsed or unheard, this report opens the possibility that their views may receive serious attention.

Dr. Saba Gul Khattak

Executive Summary

Given its geographical features and strategic location, the Malakand Division of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province in Pakistan has been susceptible to increasing natural disasters and conflicts. With a population spread over 40 percent of KP province, the region which includes Bunir, Swat, Shangla, Upper Dir, Lower Dir and Chitral suffered two major natural disasters over the past one decade: an earthquake in 2005 and massive floods in 2010. While still recovering from the physical, social, emotional and economic shocks caused by these two events, the locale became the epicenter of rising terrorism and militancy in 2009 which have resulted in even more irreparable loss to the social milieu. The militant uprising and subsequent military operation in Malakand Division, besides resulting in heavy civilian, military and law enforcement losses, has led to the displacement of nearly 2.5 million people.

Even though peace or some semblance of peace has returned to the region, communities face social, cultural and behavioral challenges compounded by loss of income generation activities or damage to sources of income support such as agriculture, livestock rearing etc. following both man-made and natural disasters. In order to mitigate the losses suffered by them, successive governments have been taking multiple measures. However, due to unremitting circumstances, coupled with declining economic variables and non-responsive social safety nets local communities, especially the most vulnerable continue to suffer. In order to assess the issues of vulnerable groups such as women, children and religious minorities; key challenges of post-conflict policing faced by both men and women; perceptions regarding conflict resolution mechanisms; and police-community relations, the present study was undertaken in four villages *Landicus* and *Gumbad Mera* in Mingora (one of the largest cities) and *Dari* and *Kabal* located in *Kabal* (one of the most attractive yet worst conflict hit rural towns) of district Swat.

The study also tries to provide a pre and post-conflict assessment of these four villages and identifies key interventions to increase resilience in the areas of political and police leadership. It outlines the steps necessary to enhance social cohesion to mitigate conflict, improve law and order and redress the immediate and long-term needs of a conflict-affected region.

Qualitative tools were used to conduct the study and data collected through Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KII)¹. The four villages for assessment were selected on the basis of direct and indirect impact of conflict on communities in the respective areas. A total of 53 KII, were conducted with community members, police officers and minority representatives. Of these respondents, 14 were women. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted with academics, journalists, and members of the *Jirgas* (community elders) at the provincial and district tiers.

¹ Also called in-depth interviews.

The key findings of the study are briefly highlighted below:

Social, Cultural and Behavioral Issues

Land and Inheritance Issues

Land and inheritance disputes figured significantly in the research findings. It was found that while in post-conflict Swat, women have become more aware of their land and property rights, they have also become more vulnerable to physical harm because now they try to exercise these rights. This was linked to the exposure women got when they were displaced during the conflict and the rise in their education level.

Violence against Women

Over 90 percent of men who participated in the KIIs were of the opinion that incidences of violence against women had decreased in post-conflict Swat; whereas majority of the women who were interviewed shared recent experiences of violence they had faced or witnessed. Contrary to men, almost all women respondents stated that domestic violence is not a personal matter, rather a social issue.

Awareness about violence against women varied in urban and rural areas though. Women in urban Mingora were more aware of their rights and about how to deal with their issues by approaching law enforcement agencies etc. particularly in the post-conflict scenario. They pointed out that community members and the police should intervene to stop domestic violence. According to majority of the rural women respondents, very few cases of domestic violence were reported to the police. Even informal institutions like *Jirga*² and other committees did not consider it a crime or issue.

Girls' Education

The Taliban or militants continue to have serious problems with girls' education, but cultural taboos also force families to keep their girls at home. This study found no significant differences in rural and urban areas in terms of discrimination against women and girls. Interestingly, while majority of the respondents were in favor of girls' education, they were hesitant to take a stand against cultural pressures.

Child Sexual Abuse

Perceptions about child sexual abuse remain indicative of the social stigma attached to it with hardly any of the study respondents accepting or sharing that such cases occur or had occurred in their areas. The respondents from urban Landicus and Gumbad Mera claimed that while incidences of child sexual abuse did occur, they did so mostly in rural areas. Those from rural Dari and Kabal highlighted the occurrence of CSA cases in mountainous regions. But upon discussions with police officers, it was found that CSA cases were happening in both rural and urban areas.

² Council of wise elders.

Insecurities amongst Minorities

Sikh, Hindu and Christian communities also reside in the selected study areas. Although they shared no overt incidents of religious intolerance in the target areas, and were fairly satisfied with the measures taken by the police to protect them, their religious places and festivals, the researchers observed an underlying feeling of insecurity and uncertainty in their demeanor during interviews.

Criminal and Illegal Activities

Like any other area in Pakistan, communities in the target areas were not immune from violent crimes including assault, robbery, honor killing, kidnapping and target killing as well as crimes like drug addiction, domestic violence, smuggling, extortion, harassment, gender discrimination, missing persons, child labor and abuse (physical and sexual). However, the nature and severity of these problems varied in urban and rural areas. There has also been a significant change in the nature and occurrence of these offences in pre and post-conflict Swat.

Policing Issues

To Police or not to Police?

During 2007-09, the policing system and infrastructure in Swat was almost completely destroyed by the Taliban. They attacked nearly every police station and executed/beheaded police personnel publically. Police stations were either under Taliban control or the policemen were confined to the police stations. From our research findings, it is estimated that 700 of the 1,734 police contingent in Swat quit their jobs because of threats to their lives and families by the Taliban. They were also not allowed to perform their duties in uniform.

While the Taliban certainly played their part in destroying police infrastructure and morale in Swat, lack of political will of the district and provincial governments also made matters worse. Militancy and terrorism is a new phenomenon for the Pakistani police force in general and those in Swat in particular who are neither trained nor equipped to combat the militants. Efforts by the KP Government during 2013-14 of increasing the number of police stations and personnel; induction of a special police force; establishment of women desks; and formation of *Islahi* (arbitrary) committees are indeed laudable. However, the majority of respondents felt these initiatives have come and are coming too little, too late. Some of reasons for the lack of support for the police administration in Swat include the following:

- The Taliban were able to manipulate and exploit public sentiment for their brutal methods under the guise of religion creating rifts between the police and citizenry.
- There was a common perception that behavior of the police towards the general community was very harsh and insensitive.
- The most basic of police procedures, registering the First Information Report (FIR), without any reference or economic standing by an ordinary citizen was described to be a Herculean task.

Police Revival

Following the successful military operations against the Taliban, the police force in Swat has once again regained control of the city and their lives. The provincial government doubled the Malakand Police

Force and by early 2011, new recruits had been hired and many of those who had ‘quit’ under the Taliban threat rejoined. New police stations have been constructed and the ones destroyed by militants rebuilt.

Law and Order Situation

This study found three main reasons for the reduction in crime rate in district Swat:

1. Deployment of more trained and equipped police officers and personnel along with the Army troops and the establishment of more police stations and checkpoints.
2. More vigilance on part of the general public with regards to any suspicious and abnormal activity around their vicinity.
3. Change in the attitude of the police after suffering at the hands of the extremists.

Women Police in Swat

While outlining the role of women police during and after the conflict, majority of the respondents were of the belief that women had little or no role in the police in pre-conflict Swat; and during Taliban’s reign of terror, the handful of women constables left their jobs fearing for their lives. However, even before the arrival of the militants, the general perceptions regarding women in the police force were negative. While a few participants did feel their presence was critical not just in routine police matters but also as officers in leadership positions.

Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

90 percent of the respondents in rural areas and 75 percent in urban areas preferred going to their local *Jirgas* rather than the police for conflict resolution. Interestingly, religious minorities in rural Dari and Kabal also preferred the local *Jirga* for conflict resolution, whereas the police was their preferred institution in the urban areas.

Police-Community Relations

It was only after the brutalities of the Taliban regime that the police and the citizens they are meant to protect realized their mutually symbiotic relationship. A relationship which is now being rebuilt through financial and capacity building support of the government. However, a great deal more needs to be done to strengthen Police Community relations.





Section I: Introduction

Background of the Study

This report highlights the findings of an action research titled *Policing Challenges and Opportunities in Post-Conflict Swat: Needs of Women, Children and Minorities 2015*. The research was carried out by Rozan, Islamabad,³ COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Abbottabad⁴ and HUIRA (Holistic Understanding for Justified Research and Action), Swat.⁵ The need for conducting this study was first felt during a regional conference in 2010 on *Gender and Policing* organized by Rozan. During the conference, Mr. Qazi Jamil ur Rehman, the then Deputy Inspector General (DIG) of Malakand Division highlighted the challenges of policing in Swat and the impact of militancy and armed conflict on the general public.

A subsequent review of literature on conflict zones and role of the police from South Asian countries like Nepal and Sri Lanka; and from Nigeria and Sierra Leon in West Africa also underscored that policing needs, issues, challenges and ethics during and after conflict situations are different.

Geophysical, Political and Cultural Milieu of Swat



Figure 1: Stupas from the Kushan era

Swat can be divided into two physical regions—mountainous ranges/valleys and plain fields. It lies in the Hindu Kush range and is an administrative district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. It is one of the six districts of Malakand Division. Chitral and Gilgit are situated in the North of Swat, Dir in the West, and Mardan in the South, while Indus separates it from Hazara in the East. The total area of District Swat is 5337 sq. km.

The Swat state was founded in 1915 by a *Jirga* who appointed Abdul Jabbar Shah as its first Ruler and *Wali*⁶ from 1915-1917. He developed the administrative system of the State which was subsequently modified and refined by his successors Miangul Abdul Wadud (1917- 1949) and Miangul Jahanzeb (1949- 1969). Despite being dependent on Pakistan for its postal service and currency etc.

this region has historically been internally independent with the provincial Chief Minister holding no authority over the *Wali*. It has had

...its own laws, its own system of justice, army, police and administration, budget and taxes, even its own flag with an emblem of a fort in golden green background (Rome 2006).

³ Rozan is an Islamabad-based non-government and non-profit organization working on issues of emotional and mental health in Pakistan.

⁴ COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, also known by its acronym CIIT, is a public research university in Pakistan. It is a multi-campus institute with its headquarters located in Islamabad.

⁵ Holistic Understanding for Justified Research and Action (HUIRA) is a Swat-based non-profit, non-political, non-ethnic and development oriented organization working in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and FATA regions of Pakistan.

⁶ *Wali*: Official title of the ruler of Swat. The Wali was not only supreme head of the State, possessing all powers, but also the virtual head of all administrative departments.

However, the princely State was dissolved in 1969 when the *Wali* acceded to Pakistan. In 1975, the Federal Government introduced the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) Regulation, vesting judicial and administrative powers to the Deputy Commissioner (DC).



Figure 2: Photo of a Buddha statue seated on a lotus throne in Swat Valley in 1869.

The valley is famous for its fruit-laden plantations, rich lands, snowcapped peaks, waterfalls, green pastures, and the ruins of Gandhara⁷ and the lesser known Dardic civilization (Torwali 2012). The once prosperous trading corridor between the plains of Gandhara and the mountains of Central Asia was also the center of Buddhist culture. To this day, some 400 stupas, monasteries, rock-carvings (figure 1 and 2) and inscriptions are scattered all over the Swat Valley (Wikipedia).

Swat is a Pakhtun dominated area where Yusufzai Pakhtuns are the largest and most powerful tribe. There are other ethnic groups in the area as well including Akhund Khel Miangans (Syeds), Gujjars and Parachas. The Torwalis and Gawri (Kalami) communities who have ancient roots in the Dardic civilization are lesser known and inhabit Swat-Kohistan (Torwali n.d.).

The principal language of the region is Pashto, but Torwali, Gojri, Kalami and Urdu are also spoken and understood. The Pakhtuns adhere to a unique, traditional yet ‘evolving culture’ (Khan 2014b), what the former refer to as an ‘unwritten constitution’ called *Pakhtunwali* or *Pashtunwali* (Khan 2014a).⁸ While it has its roots in ancient times, this system of governance is still prevalent in Swat’s rural tribal areas.

Law and Order Situation of Swat

The history of police reforms in Pakistan is full of abortive attempts to change the colonial legacy of the oppressive Police Act 1861. Despite the recommendations of over two dozen commissions, committees and foreign missions appointed periodically, any hope of changing the law remained elusive till 2002, when Police Order was promulgated. The goal of the new order was to institute a politically neutral, highly accountable, and extremely professional police organization. The Police Order focused on a number of issues: the misuse of authority; the arbitrary use of power; political interference in police operations and administration; the lack of service orientation; corruption; misbehavior; and the ineffective command and control of the police forces. Structurally, it replaced political control of the

⁷ Gandhara was an ancient kingdom in the Swat Valley, Potohar Plateau and Peshawar which are now parts of northern Pakistan and northeastern Afghanistan (Wikipedia).

⁸ This code of conduct includes ‘*Nanawatee (refuge)*, which in Pashto literally means to “get in” (the protection or the house of) or take refuge. Besides *Nanawatee* the other tenets of *Pakhtunwali* include: *Melmastia (hospitality)*, *Badal (revenge to seek justice)*, *Turah (bravery)*, *Sabat (loyalty)*, *Imandari (honesty)*, *Isteqamat (determination due to trust in God)*, *Ghairat (self-dignity and honor)*, and *Namoos (the honor of women)*’ (Khan 2014a).

police with democratic institutional control through the mechanism of public safety commissions at the district, provincial, and national levels. But a series of amendments were made in the new law by successive governments that damaged its original intent and spirit. In 2011, the provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan took retrogressive steps and reverted to Police Act of 1861. However in Punjab and KP, Police Order 2002 is being implemented in its amended form.

Swat has traditionally been a peaceful place as compared to the other areas of KP. Evidence of its good law and order situation is its tourism industry that was one of its flourishing industries. Tourists from across Pakistan as well as from different parts of the world used to visit the area every year. Due to nonviolent and hospitable nature of locals, the district was managed by a small police force (less than 2000 personnel) prior to the militant insurgency and armed conflict. In fact, the police in Swat has always been perceived less corrupt as compared to the rest of KP Police even before the conflict. The relationship between the police and community was amicable because both knew each other and often belonged to similar areas or tribes.

One of the reasons for this harmonious relationship as compared to the rest of KP/Pakistan was the legacy of the Princely State of Swat (pre-1969). The Princely State was better in terms of governance and service delivery especially with regards to health, education and justice, so the policing was also better in general. The police enjoyed financial and operational independence during that era.

The situation arising from the War on Terror was a completely new phenomenon for the police force in KP. They were trained to perform traditional policing functions like maintaining law and order and protecting the life and property of citizens under normal circumstances. In fact, because of its small and relatively basic training, limited resources and poor equipment, terrorist tactics focused predominantly on the police in Swat. Police personnel were targeted and killed while commuting between stations, or to and from their homes. One can have a very clear idea of the capacity of the KP and Swat police force from a comment made by a retired KP police officer: *'The suicide blast site was a new thing for the police; they had no idea what to look for.'*

According to Professor Hassan Abbas, senior adviser at the Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center and director of the Pakistan Study Group at the Asia Society in New York:

Pakistan's civilian law enforcement structure has failed to develop any systematic and advanced counterterrorism strategy owing to the lack of modern investigative tools, requisite skills, and incentives. For the same reasons, it is no surprise that the rate of crimes not associated with terrorism has also jumped in recent years. Law-and-order duties and Very Important Person (VIP) protection responsibilities consume a significant chunk of police resources.

Police capacity is critical for tackling terrorism and controlling insurgency-infested areas. A growing body of empirical research has established that law enforcement, not military force, is the most effective tool for this task (Abbas 2011).

According to a study conducted by Jones and Libicki (2008), of 268 terrorist groups, 40 percent ended through effective policing and mere 7 percent through military force; while 43 percent because their members adopted nonviolent tactics and joined the political process. If we analyze the allocation of resources for police force as compared to the Army in the War on Terror, a huge difference is found. For instance, Abbas (2009) quotes Templer's paper of the same year which asserts that 'in 2007, the United States allocated \$731 million to help Pakistan's military and only \$4.9 million for its police.'

Decline of Swat: A Look Back



Figure3: Saidu Sharif, capital of Swat Valley.

Swat was known as the Switzerland of Pakistan. It was once a popular vacation destination famous for its great natural beauty and peaceful environment.

However, **two cataclysmic disasters** have changed the very face of this former paradise on Earth.

1. Man-made Disaster: Armed Conflict

The first occurred in 1989: a movement demanding the enforcement of Shariah Law was born in Dir District of Malakand Division. The movement became famous under the banner *Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi*⁹ (TNSM) led by Sufi Muhammad¹⁰ and spread to Swat, Buner, Shangla, Indus Kohistan, and Bajaur.

The Supreme Court and High Court, Peshawar abolished the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) Regulation in 1992 but no alternative system was put in place as a replacement...On December 1, 1994, the then Governor of NWFP enforced Nizaam-e-Shariat Regulation. However, this did not bring any change nor redressed the people's grievances due to which TNSM's activities and demands for a change in the judicial system and enforcement of Islamic laws continued (Bangash 2012).

In 2002, Fazlullah, son-in-law of Sufi Muhammad emerged as the new leader of the TNSM.¹¹ During 2004-07, he set up 30 illegal FM radio stations in Swat and other tribal areas to get his sermons across and was nicknamed 'Mullah Radio'. The strategies adopted by Fazlullah were simple yet effective:

The strategy adopted by Fazlullah to bring about a shift in the socio-cultural and political power structures in Swat valley included a narrative based on Salafi jihadist

⁹ Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law.

¹⁰ Sufi Muhammad was a member of Jamat-i-Islami, a well-organized religious political party of Pakistan. He belongs to Maidan area of Dir and was nominated as the *Nazim Aala* (supreme organizer/chief) of TNSM in 1989.

¹¹ Sometimes referred to as chief of the Swat Taliban. In 2013, Fazlullah became head of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.

ideology, ideological persuasion, the spread of this ideology, social control and expansion of that control.

Fazlullah's discourse revolved around 'jihad', martyrdom, the revival of Islam's glory; it was an anti-modernity, anti-woman and anti-state narrative. The illegal FM radio proved an effective tool to disseminate the discourse because it was inexpensive and easily accessible (Hussain 2013).

During 2006-07, TNSM convinced communities to close music shops, men to stop shaving their beard, not to listen to music, and curb women's mobility. As soon as this form of 'social control' received even the slightest community support, the approach of this banned militant outfit became harsher. They put a ban on women education, work and mobility; announced death penalty for barbers who shaved beards; and attacked Polio-vaccination teams.

There was a time '*when police stations were bombed... parallel courts established and public executions of policemen, government officials and those disobeying the Taliban became the order of the day*' (Hussain 2013). Even funerals of police officers were attacked:

A suicide bomber detonated explosives around his waist during the funeral prayers for DSP Lakki Marwat Javed Iqbal, who was killed along with three other cops in a remote-controlled bomb explosion. At least, 52 persons, including a Station House Officer (SHO) and son of DSP Javed Iqbal, were killed in the incident while over 100 others sustained injuries (Khan 2008).

The decapitated bodies of policemen, left with warning notes to authorities, were now a common sight on the streets in the area (Al-Jazeera 2009).

However, no armed action took place till late October 2007. Being allowed free reign over his FM radio broadcasts and his activities by both the provincial and federal governments, Fazlullah issued orders to eradicate obscenity, started attacks on security checkpoints and police outposts, kidnapping and killing hundreds of security personnel using his armed contingent called Shaheen Force (Eagle Force). The group later became famous as Swat Taliban and Tehreek-e-Taliban Swat.

More Army troops were deployed into Swat and the security forces started armed action called Operation *Rah-e-Haq* (Operation Righteous Path) in October 2007. During this Operation, Swat suffered major infrastructure damage and high civilian death toll. Dozens of police and Army troops were either killed, surrendered or deserted when the militants took over police stations and over-ran check posts and took control of the region. In one of the study areas Kabal, the Taliban even set up their own local 'governors'. However, by bolstering its ground and air defense, the Armed Forces claimed success in restoring writ of the government in Swat by January 2008 and the provincial government entered into a peace agreement with Fazlullah's Swat Taliban in April-May 2008.

Unfortunately, hostilities renewed and in July 2008, the Armed Forces started Phase Two and then Three of Operation *Rah-e-Haq* (Operation Righteous Path) in January 2009 to secure the main supply lines and consolidate Swat District. Once again, the government negotiated with the Taliban and in February 2009 allowed Sharia law and Sharia courts to be set up in the Malakand region. This controversial and much debated 'peace' agreement also came to naught and the Second Battle of Swat also known as *Operation Rah-e-Nijat* (Operation Path to Salvation) began in May 2009 in the commercial capital of Swat district, Mingora. By some estimates, this used to be a city of 200,000 people and in less than a month of conflict, it became a ghost town following an unprecedented mass exodus leaving behind only 10,000-20,000 civilians. In September 2009, Pakistan Army was able to take back complete control of Swat district and announced an end to its operations. According to ICG (2013):

...the military operation that followed in May displaced almost three million people, destroyed the region's infrastructure and gravely eroded the capacity of already fragile civilian institutions to respond to citizens' needs.

This armed conflict not only forced the displacement of civilians, destruction of infrastructure, agricultural livelihoods, suspension of basic services especially health and education as well as loss of civilian lives (Bangash 2012), it has produced psychological and economic aftershocks that are still felt more than five years later. According to a senior police officer in Swat:

"The insurgency has left very deep scars. The people have been traumatised; there was a great deal of personal suffering.Every second or third home has suffered a personal or a heavy financial loss (ICG 2013)."

2. Natural Disaster: Floods

The struggles of the brave people of Swat did not come to an end when the armed conflict on their beloved and once peaceful region came to a halt. Their resilience was tested once more. But this time the disaster was natural and came in July-August of 2010: Severe monsoon rains causing massive floods stretching from the high Northern Areas to the plains of Sindh affecting more than 20 million people throughout Pakistan.

Destructive flash flooding of an unprecedented nature occurred in the Swat River far exceeding a 100-year flood event (World Bank and ADB 2011).

According to the World Health Organization (2011), Swat was one of 23 worst affected districts in the country with nearly 1,75,2155 people affected. In Swat Valley alone, 12 major bridges and several major roads along the River Swat were swept away, isolating villages and destroying agriculture- the region's source of livelihoods. According to the World Bank and ADB assessment (2011), in Swat, district jails and judicial lock-ups were damaged and since district court buildings were completely submerged, 50 percent of all records were lost. The floods washed away the Munda Headworks on Swat

River and Lower Swat Canal (LSC) -a critical source of irrigation. Of some estimated 320 hotels, 70 were damaged by the floods.

Objectives of the Study

The core objective of the study is to provide a comprehensive pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict assessment of four villages in District Swat by analyzing the social, cultural, behavioral and policing issues and challenges facing the local people. Additionally, the study aims to present a set of recommendations and key interventions to increase resilience of the most vulnerable groups (women, children, minorities and even the police force itself). It will outline the steps necessary to enhance social cohesion to mitigate conflict, improve law and order and redress the immediate and long-term needs of this region.

Research Methodology

The study methodology included desk based review, examination of relevant policies and frameworks, key informant interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) alongwith primary data collection from the police stations and the office of the District Police Officer, Swat.

Research Instruments

COMSATS Institute of Information Technology (CIIT), Abbottabad, with the feedback from partner organizations developed question guidelines/research tools to collect data from the field. Four separate question guides were developed, one each for the police, community women, men and minorities. Each question guide was divided into areas like policing in pre and post-conflict Swat, disputes/issues in community, role of police in dispute resolution, violence against women, children and minorities, and women in policing. (See Annexure 2 for details)

Data Collection

A joint team of researchers from Rozan, HUIRA and COMSATS carried out 53 key informant interviews (KIIs) and 7 focus group discussions (FGDs) in Swat. The joint team was divided into four sub-teams to conduct the KIIs and FGDs. Minimum ten interviews were conducted in each village/location selected for the research. 30% of the respondents in each village were women. Three (2 men and a woman) interviews were conducted with religious minorities which included Sikhs and Christians. In addition, interviews of male police officials of different ranks were conducted in police stations. The interviews were open ended. 4 FGDs were conducted with the police officers/personnel belonging to all 21 police stations of district Swat (Table 1)¹². The District Police Officer was also interviewed at his office.

Table 1: Research Instruments and Participant Profiles

Key Informant Interviews (KIIs)		Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)	
Interviewee	No. of KIIs	Group	No. of FGDs
Community women	12	Journalists	1
Community men	28	Police	4
Minority representatives	3	Local professionals/ intellectuals	1
Policewomen	2	Community Influentials	1
Policemen	8		
Total	53	Total	7

Data Analysis

The data was recorded in hand written form. Before analysis, it was saved on MS Word by the data collectors. It was then analyzed jointly by Rozan and CIIT. Since the number of KIIs and FGDs were manageable it was analyzed manually without using any software.

Geographical Scope of the Study

The study was conducted in four locations of District Swat, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Two were rural and two urban areas:

Mingora (capital of Swat)

- *Landicus*
- *Gumbad Mera*

Kabal (one of the most attractive yet worst conflict hit rural towns).

- *Dari*
- *Kabal*

Research Challenges

1. A key challenge in the field was to get the respondents to give time (45minutes to an hour) to conduct KIIs, especially women respondents. They were informed well before time with the help of the local organization HUIRA but even then it was not easy for them to give the required time.
2. Because of the sensitive nature of the research topic and the law and order situation in the study areas, respondents were not very open to share their views and information. Therefore, a lot of time and energy went into building rapport with interviewees. In some cases, the

¹² It is important to point out that since women comprise less than 1% of the total police force, their number in the research is also small.

duration of the interview was very short as the respondents were not willing to share in-depth information.

3. Although in arranging interviews with police personnel, formal approval was taken from the senior police management, the former were reluctant to give interviews. The male police personnel did not allow interviews with women police separately and insisted that the interviews be conducted in their presence.
4. Since data collection was done in a go i.e. during one week on back to back days, there was not enough time to document data on a daily basis.
5. Obtaining secondary data from the District Police Office was very difficult.
6. The study team was also fearful of travelling and conducting interviews in the field, because the area had been stricken by a violent conflict and the fear could still be seen in the interviewee's body language and facial expressions.

Sharing Research with Communities

Non-governmental organizations often tend to present their research at conferences, to other development sector colleagues, to policy-makers or the media. However, the Technical Committee of this research study decided in the very beginning that the research findings would first be presented to the communities in a multi-stakeholder meeting in Swat before being formally published. This was decided not only to get the findings validated, but also because holding such meetings/sessions allows the researchers to receive feedback on their results, giving new insights and creating a circular process rather than a linear one. It is also an important part of building relationships between researchers and the communities.

The meeting was held on 5 March 2015 in Swat. It was attended by community women including teachers, lady health visitors and social workers; community men including heads of *jirgas* and *musalihati* (reconciliatory) committees, lawyers, lecturers, doctors, social workers, students, police officers from the study areas and minority representatives. In total, the meeting was attended by 45 participants (37 men and 8 women).

It provided an opportunity to further enrich the findings with the help of the participants' input. Explaining to people in rural areas why action research is done especially when they have endured so much hardship at the hands of nature and man is often challenging. Returning and sharing the results helps communities understand the relevance of such investigations, and how the information collected from them is useful – for them and for us. This helps build trust and lays the groundwork for more in-depth studies. And although some people in some communities remain skeptical about the value of information – as opposed to the more concrete benefits/services given by NGOs – the community members who took part in this study responded well to the meeting and endorsed the research findings. They also highlighted a few more points to deepen the understanding of policing related issues of Swat.





Section II: Research Findings

Social, Cultural and Behavioral Issues

This section provides details about the major social, cultural and behavioral issues that communities in general and in the surveyed areas in particular have been facing in pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict Swat.

Land and Inheritance Issues

Issues pertaining to land have a complex relationship with the political economy of armed conflict. In case of the armed conflict in Swat, there was massive displacement of families and communities which is one of the most direct causes of vulnerability. More than any other impact, it was land issues that figured most prominently and powerfully in the study findings. Whether through forced eviction, confiscation or occupation of their land and homes in their absence (and even during it), many of the respondents had lost their most basic source of shelter, privacy and livelihoods.

Research showed that after the conflict, while women were more aware of their rights in property, it has resulted in creating greater insecurity for them as shared below:

I acquired my share in the property through courts but at the cost of estrangement from my brothers.

-Woman respondent from Landicus

Women who lodged cases about property inheritance were frequently threatened and at times killed. According to a woman respondent from the village of Kabal:

Few days ago a man killed his sister-in-law (Bhabhi) just to have ownership of his late brother's land.

It was found that no FIR was lodged against him since he was a very influential person.

Violence Against Women

Physical and emotional domestic violence is often considered 'not that serious' in comparison to other issues in conflict-prone and post-conflict areas. This harsh reality came out vividly during interviews and discussion with the women in all four areas, rural and urban. In fact, physical violence, especially battering by husband and other family members was reported in all of the focus groups and in-depth interviews conducted with police, men, women and minorities. Furthermore, most respondents added that violence against women was not considered an 'issue', rather it was part of routine life. One woman respondent went so far as to say that,

It is part of Pakhtoon culture.

For the survivors of man-made and natural disasters of Swat, domestic violence is a back-burner concern:

My husband used to beat me almost every day. I was just 13 years old when I got married. I never used to raise my voice on this issue, because of the fear that my

family will blame me. Once my husband beat me and asked me to leave the house. My brother-in-law was living near our house and I went to them. They asked me not to tell anyone what had happened. So I never told anyone about it. I have never gone to the police or Jirga because this is considered a disgrace to the family. I have never even thought of raising my voice about this issue because in our society it is very common to blame the woman.

---Woman respondent from Landicus

Another woman from the same area said:

My husband is a drug addict. He used to beat me, almost every day. Once he tried to kill me with a knife because I was not giving him money.

One of the key reasons women stay in abusive relationships is financial dependence and the social stigma attached to separation and divorce. Most of the women in this study considered it a cultural taboo to go to the courts or *Jirga*.

The study also found that respondents from urban areas found it difficult to talk about sensitive issues like sexual harassment and honor killing. However, the respondents from the rural areas were more open to share their experiences and knowledge about these issues. Also, as compared to men, women respondents from rural areas were more open to discuss the issues of sexual harassment and honor killing. A woman respondent from the rural area shared:

Almost two months ago, a father killed his daughter and son-in-law. The daughter got divorced from her first husband because of domestic violence and got married to a man of her own choice, but the father was not happy so he killed both of them. The father is in jail now but I am sure he will not be convicted.

While talking about elopement, respondents shared that in almost all cases where girls who elope are found, they are killed by their relatives:

Fifteen days ago, a girl was arrested by the Army who was eloping at night. The girl stayed with the Army for four days, but later, the father of the girl took her home and killed her by adding poison to her food. No one lodged FIR against the father.

----Woman respondent from Kabal

Girls' Education

Studies indicate that during the 2007-09 conflict, more than 50% of schools were completely destroyed by the militants, of which according to the Institute of Peace Studies, 116 were for girls. More than 80,000 girls reportedly dropped out from school during the conflict. But it is not just the Taliban or militants who have a problem with girls' education, cultural taboos about educating women also forces families to keep their girls at home as shown by some of the comments made by women respondents:

My daughter was going to school but everyone was saying that she is going to be a bad girl. So I stopped her schooling and got her married although she was just 15 years old.

----Woman respondent from Landicus

Girls are not allowed to go outside even for education. People here say that if a girl is in 10th grade, it means for sure that she has 10 boyfriends (Agar larki 10 class parhay ge to us kay 10 yaar hon ge).

----Woman respondent from Kabal

This study found no significant differences in rural and urban areas in terms of discrimination against women and girls. Interestingly, while majority of the respondents were in favor of girls' education, they were hesitant to take a stand against cultural pressures. In some cases, women were also found reinforcing the stereotypical mindset against girls' education:

I am not in favor of girls' education. The girls who go outside for education always bring dishonor to the family because most of the time they have affairs with boys. The Taliban banned girls' education because of this reason.

-----Woman respondent from Gumbad Mera

Even though the Taliban have been pushed out of Swat, due to lingering fears and insecurities about their resurgence, respondents who do want to send their girls to schools are hesitant and unsure.

Child Sexual Abuse

The most sensitive issue to talk about in the study areas was child sexual abuse (CSA). Majority of the respondents both in urban and rural areas, either had no response or shared that they did not know about this issue or were hesitant to talk about it. However, some police respondents did mention cases of CSA in their interviews. A woman police officer from Police Station Mingora mentioned that such cases do exist. She highlighted sexual abuse of a 9-year old boy by a *maulvi* (religious cleric). She said that most of the time people hide this issue and avoid registering FIRs of CSA cases.

Another respondent from Kabal highlighted the CSA case of another boy from early 2014:

A 9-year old boy was sexually abused and then murdered in the corn fields by his servant. He was the only child and belonged to a very rich family here. Later, the servant was arrested by the Army and he is now in an Army prison. His home was burnt by the Army and all of his family members left the area because of the fear of Army.

The fact that CSA not only exists and people are aware of its dark presence can be understood by the ominous comments made by respondents from both the rural villages in Kabal:

When the corn fields are ready to be reaped, people usually don't allow their kids to go outside as the stems of the corn are very tall and children are more vulnerable to get abused in the corn fields.

Insecurities amongst Minorities

It was observed by the researchers that the minorities somehow felt insecure in revealing their religious identity. Rather, they took refuge behind the predominant religion of the region in order to feel secure. During the field work, it was observed that in the shop of a minority representative there were several wall hangings and large stickers of Islamic calligraphy, but there was nothing there representing their own religion. Even when asked by the researcher, the shopkeeper did not give any specific answer. In a way, this showed that minority communities are not comfortable in disclosing their religious identity or they feel that the people belonging to the dominant religion will respect them more if they display Islamic art.

A visit to the local temple also revealed that the place had no distinguishing features as a formal place of worship, rather it was located in a residential area and looked like an ordinary house; once again indicating reluctance of the community to show their religious identity.

The minorities also seem to feel that the local people from the dominant religion consider them lesser Pakistanis. So they try to put an extra effort to prove that they also love Pakistan as much as Muslims do. Although no such feeling was verbalized by the minority respondents, this inference was drawn when one respondent shared his complaint application to the police. It was a two and a half page application, but its first two pages were just in the praise of the Army and police, and the actual complaint was mentioned on the last half page.

Criminal and Illegal Activities

According to the findings of the research, a range of violent crimes and illegal activities are part of the fabric of the four selected study locations. These include assault, robbery, honor killing, kidnapping and target killing as well as crimes like drug addiction, domestic violence, smuggling, extortion, harassment, gender discrimination and missing persons without FIRs.

Majority of the respondents shared that during the armed conflict, they did not notice crimes like theft, robbery and abduction. Even issues like domestic violence, sexual harassment and child sexual abuse seemed non-existent. Perhaps because of the presence of the Taliban everyone was so frightened for their very lives, that these issues seemed too minor to notice.

However, respondents of the rural areas shared that the number of cases of robbery and theft were very low or near to zero because of the presence of the Army and night guards. Night guarding was started by local communities and neighborhoods in many areas. In other parts, community police called *Lashkar* had taken up this responsibility. A Special Police Force (SPF) has also been established to improve the law and order situation. Respondents also felt that since the security forces had destroyed the houses of many criminals (mostly Taliban) crime rate had decreased. It was also found that there was a difference in the nature and severity of criminal and illegal activities in the urban and rural areas.

Policing Issues

To Police or not to Police?

During the 2008-2009 conflict in Swat, the district police became virtually defunct (ICG 2013).

Police, as the key law enforcement agency was a main target of the Taliban during the Swat conflict. The militants were greater in number, trained in warfare and equipped with heavy artillery, while the police cadre in Swat was small, poorly equipped and had no training to combat terrorism. They were trained to deal with more conventional crimes like theft, murder and kidnapping but not engage in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations.



Figure 4: A police station under the control of Taliban (2008)

The police system and the infrastructure was completely destroyed by the Taliban during the conflict. They attacked almost every police station and killed several policemen in the main market of Swat which is now famous as *Khooni Chowk* (Bloody Junction). At various times during the conflict, police stations in Swat were either in control of terrorists or the police personnel were trapped inside without food and water (Figure 4 and 5).

At times they had to take food and other necessities from the Army since they could not access the market places in uniform. During the Taliban regime, the police was functional to some extent only in the main town of Saidu Sharif where offices and residences of government officials were located. The fear instilled by the militant group was so high that police cadre avoided sharing that they worked in the police force. Many police personnel left their jobs due to death threats to their lives and even to their families and relatives. The Taliban had in many cases ‘instructed’ personnel to publish in local newspapers that they had quit their job.

Many policemen remained in their houses and some even left Swat till the Army started their Operations and reclaimed the district from the Taliban. Police officers were declared as *Murtid* (non-Muslim/apostate) for serving a pro-United States government in Pakistan. Militants also attacked funerals of several policemen.



Figure 5: A militant stands outside the Matta Police Station with a signboard announcing that the station is now under Taliban control (November 2007)

The police officers were killed publically to terrify others into leaving the force. A woman police constable was also slaughtered by the Taliban. This was not only a message for those who worked in the police department, but also for all working women as the Taliban are opposed to the concept.

All respondents from the police shared that during the conflict, they performed their duties in plain clothes rather than in uniform within their station jurisdiction:

The government allowed us to do our duty without uniform because the Taliban were targeting the policemen frequently across the region.

We were doing our duty without uniform so that we could not be identified but the people were still able to recognize us.

Families feared constantly for the safety and lives of their loved ones in harm's way. Suddenly, the police had to protect themselves, their families and citizens, all at the same time. Many police personnel shifted their families to other areas/cities with relatives but even that did not allay their insecurity. A respondent shared that even his close relatives refused to keep his family with them: 'One can easily comprehend the severity of fear in our hearts', a policeman said. Another police respondent said,

My father told me to go to the Taliban commander of our village, surrender and leave my job, but I refused to quit. Many policemen quit their jobs for a short period of time, but later they re-joined the police.

Apart from lack of training and weapons required for combating terrorism, another reason for the collapse of the police force was that the Taliban were using the name of Islam to garner support from the local community. Residents of Swat, one of the most socially conservative regions in the country' (ICG 2013) welcomed the Taliban who were claiming to spread the teachings and practices of Islam in the area:

Taliban did not start their brutalities suddenly, rather they gained support of locals by preaching small things like Muslim men should have beards, they should not listen to music, and women must wear the veil etc.

---a Police man during FGD

By mid-2007, the Fazlullah's TNSM established a parallel government in Swat where Qazi courts functioned to enforce Shariah laws and started resolving local criminal and civil cases at a swift pace. This was contrary to the traditional judicial system, which required far more time and financial resources to settle legal cases. Simultaneously, they kept increasing their number in the area and continued equipping themselves with heavy arsenal. Very soon afterwards, they started attacking the police and other government installations in the name of Islam and ultimately took over the entire area. Finally, they used brutality and barbarism as another tool to enforce their writ in the area and to make people follow them without any resistance.

The morale of the police was extremely low during 'Talibanization' in Swat. On the one hand, they were being brutally killed; and on the other, local community was not supporting them due to threats and pressure of the Taliban.

During the FGD with professionals, it was shared that the local administration and police should have performed more responsibly to prevent the militancy from getting out of control. But initially, the Taliban were not taken seriously by the district and provincial governments. A journalist added that before the Army Operation against the militants, police were not allowed to operate freely by the local administration. He further added that it seemed as though the government and local community were supporting Taliban. When the insurgency grew more vicious and there was terror everywhere, it was too late. A group of doctors, journalists and lecturers shared that the police force was victimized the most and there was widescale consensus amongst all respondents that the police force sacrificed their lives in the line of duty. It was in fact their sacrifices which helped them win back the trust and sympathies of the general public. Even though community members could not stand by or even help the police during the conflict due to Taliban threats, most of them shared great pain at the loss of their lives.

Police Revival

By mid-2010 following the successful Army Operations, the situation *viz-a-viz* the police force started improving. The provincial government doubled the Malakand Police Force and by early 2011, new recruits had been hired and many of those who had ‘quit’ under the Taliban threat rejoined. New police stations were constructed and the ones destroyed by militants rebuilt. Table 1 gives an overview of the pre and post-conflict status of Swat’s Police Force:

Table 2: Pre and Post-Conflict Police Statistics

	Pre-Conflict	Post-Conflict
No. of Police Stations	09	20
No. of Swat Police	2039	2860
No. of Mobile Vehicles	92	158
No. of Women Police	0	21
Special Police Force	0	Men: 2279 Women: 30
Women Complaint Cells	0	04
No. of Minority Members in Police Force	0	03

Source: District Police Office Swat, January 2015.

Now the community and police both feel that they have regained control of their lives and their beloved Swat. While the police department undertakes actions against all kinds of crimes, in case of insurgents who appear at times in some pockets of Swat, the former now operate in collaboration with the Pakistan

Army. During raids on militant hideouts, the police generally take the lead and the Army provides the required back-up support.

Police is now working independently and Army has no presence in the police stations across the region.

-----FGD participant

A large majority of the police respondents were not aware of pre-women legislation passed during the last one decade.

Law and Order Situation


Majority of the police respondents shared that the nature of crimes has significantly changed in Swat after the conflict. Crimes like kidnapping for ransom, murders, theft, street crimes, pick pocketing, and snatching of personal belongings had reduced. An officer of Police Station Kabal shared that only two cases of theft were reported in the last six months i.e. mid of 2014. *'I think these cases are 5% of what it used to be before the Taliban conflict began'*, he further added.

According to observations of some of the police officers, there were three main reasons for the reduction in crimes:

1. Deployment of more trained and equipped police officers and personnel along with the Army troops and the establishment of more police stations and checkpoints.
2. More vigilance on part of the general public with regards to any suspicious and abnormal activity around their vicinity.
3. Change in the attitude of the police after suffering at the hands of the extremists.

Some of the participants attributed the decrease in crime rate to the increase in education and awareness in Swat. Some of the police respondents also shared that the takeover of Swat by the Taliban was 'a blessing in disguise' since the police and general public feel a bit closer to one another. Both suffered due to the divide and lack of trust between them. The police have learnt that they would be more weak and vulnerable to the attacks of extremists if their behavior towards communities is not professional and honest. Similarly, the local community feels that their lack of trust on the police can take them back to the worst era of the Taliban. So they keep the police in the loop in case they see any suspicious individual, group or activity happening around them.

Figure 6: Major Crimes Registered at Police Station Kabal




Source: Data collected from Police Station Kabal.

Figure 6 shows the number of major crimes reported at Police Station Kabal, a rural police station, during the pre-conflict years i.e. 2005-07 and the post-conflict years i.e. 2013-14. It reveals that the average number of murder cases reported per year at the police station was 22 approximately during the pre-conflict years; while the average number of murder cases reduced to 6 per year in 2013 and 2014 which is a significant decrease. The average number of attempted murder cases reported per year was 31 during the pre-conflict years; while it reduced to 8 in 2013 and 2014. The cases of robbery and kidnapping were already quite low during 2005-07; no case of robbery was reported in 2013 and 2014 and only 1 case of kidnapping was reported in 2014.

Apart from the above major crimes, minor crimes like over-pricing, encroachments, wall chalking etc. were also registered by the police since according to them registering such cases is ‘an indicator of police efficiency.’ The general public is often reluctant to register smaller crimes claiming that the police will neither register nor follow up on them. The data below shows otherwise.

Figure 7: Miscellaneous Cases Registered at Police Station Kabal



Source: Data collected from Police Station Kabal.


Figure 7 reveals that even though in 2013 miscellaneous crimes registered by Police Station Kabal were less than half of the average of the pre-conflict era, in 2014, the number doubled again but was still less than the pre-conflict years showing that the rate of small crimes decreased overall.

The tribal border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan are fertile grounds for drug smuggling. According to NBR (2009):

The drug trade across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is not only weakening state control but also cementing linkages among drug traffickers throughout the larger region, Taliban, insurgents, and criminal groups.

Given this, drug trafficking is also a serious concern for the region because it is a potential source of terrorist revenue. Figure 8 shows the number of units of drugs recovered from the jurisdiction of Police Station Mingora during 2013 and 2014. The drugs include opium, alcohol, heroine and hashish. We see slightly more units were recovered in 2014 as compared to 2013.

Figure 8: No. of Drugs Units Recovered by PS Mingora



Source: Data collected from Police Station Mingora.

According to police respondents, at times the nature of crimes/conflicts also varies from one police jurisdiction to the next. For instance, in the mountainous region crimes like abduction, murder and tribal rivalries are reported more. There was a consensus amongst the respondents from Police Station Mingora that ‘passing’ bad cheques by businessmen and real estate/car buyers was the most reported crime in urban Swat, while property disputes were most common in rural Swat. Majority of the police respondents did not mention cases of rape or sexual abuse during their discussion. However, after some probing they did share incidence of such cases.

Interestingly, community members from urban areas said that sexual abuse incidents did happen but mostly in rural areas; while participants from the two rural areas under study highlighted the occurrence of these crimes in mountainous regions. This reflects the stigma attached to the issue of sexual violence: no one was ready to accept that such incidents took place in their areas.

Women Police in Swat

General Perceptions

A woman police officer shared that although the law and order situation was apparently under control, she still felt unsafe traveling in police uniform. One of the reasons for this feeling of insecurity stems from the general public’s lack of appreciation and respect towards the women police cadre. In fact, the officer shared that no male member from her family even knew that she worked in the police.

This perspective was validated by the community respondents during KIIs and FGDs. According to women constables, people think that women working in the police are not of ‘good character’ as they work with men and their duty timings are odd. One of the study respondents said:

Women working in the police are not good as they sit with men. People believe they are bad character girls. I also don't want my daughter to join the police. Every type of person comes to police stations, mostly criminals.

Another respondent held the view that he would not allow his daughter to join the police because:

It is against Pakhtunwali that a woman works with males....it's not our culture, and Islam also forbids women to work with men.

However, to say such views are held only by the male members of Swat's community would be incorrect. Even community women are often against the idea. According to the widow of a deceased policeman:

The perception about women police is really bad. People don't like them. Most of the religious people are against the freedom of women. They say that women police are vulgar and of bad character, they work in police station with men and they have illicit relations with them.

A senior police officer voiced his opinion claiming:

Women are physically not strong enough to join the police; society generally does not appreciate women joining police, so they are less in number. There is no regular pick and drop facility for them. Police duty timings do not suit women, they cannot stay late if they are dealing with a case. Hence, they cannot be a good police officer.

In fact, while outlining the role of women police during and after the conflict, majority of the respondents were of the belief that women had little or no role in the police in pre-conflict Swat; and during Taliban's reign of terror, the handful of women constables who were in the police force left their jobs following a horrendous episode shared during a FGD:

During the conflict, a woman constable was abducted by the Taliban when she was getting out of a police vehicle along with her colleagues. After three days, her beheaded body was found. The incident had serious impacts not only on the women working in the police, but their families were also adversely affected.

Unfortunately, community members, even women, were also unaware of women serving in their respective police stations. One woman respondent said:

There are no women police in my village. The first time I saw women police was yesterday when they came to the school and put up some charts in the class.

Like most issues related to gender, religion and culture, not everything is totally black and white. There were those in the study who had a completely different perspective. One male respondent claimed that:

I don't have any issues if my daughter wants to join the police. Women should be in police to better deal with the women related cases.

Another advocated that:

Inclusion of women in police varies from place to place. In some regions in Pakistan, environment may be conducive for women in police and they play their role for the development of the country.

Recruitment, Responsibilities and Training

However, despite these mixed perceptions and the shocking tragedy of the executed officer, women are heroically serving in the police in post-conflict Swat, although less in number. A woman working in the Special Police Force (SPF) shared that at the police training center, there were 60 women and for the regular police, there were 13 constables and two *hawaldars*. At the police station in Saidu Sharif where she was posted, there were two women constables.

Responding to a question about the recruitment of women in police, District Police Officer (DPO)-Swat shared that:

The number of women in police needs to be increased. In order to increase their number advertisement for women's posts were published in newspapers but no woman applied. This may be because of the local culture and pressure of family members on them.

The DPO further added that in post-conflict Swat:

Police is focusing on the cases of gender-based violence (GBV) and women facilitation counters have been established in the police stations of Swat. The cases of Swara and Wani are dealt with zero tolerance. In 2013, the cases of Swara were higher, but due to affirmative actions taken by the police against the culprits, the number of these cases decreased in 2014.

As far as what women police officers do, a *Moharrir* (a policeman appointed to deal with visitors in the police station) said that:

Policewomen do not perform any technical task. One of the responsibilities of a policewoman is to register the cases of violence against women. They are asked to accompany male colleagues for raids and house searches.

This was also confirmed by a police woman during the FGD:

My only duty is to search the women or to accompany the police during house searches. I also accompany women criminals to the courts but at that times I feel so scared.

In terms of capacity building and training, she shared the following:

We just received initial one month training at police lines in which we were briefly told how to do body search and home search. We did not even receive basic training

about how to fire a pistol or gun. The Government should at least give us safe residence and free educational facilities for our kids.

Decision-making

Our study found that women police have almost no role in decision-making. In fact, there is only one woman Assistant Sub-Inspector in Swat. A head constable from Mingora Police Station summed up this rather myopic thinking regarding women officers:

Women can never lead a police station as they are not mentally strong.

In fact, such views are not uncommon even amongst the more educated of Pakistani society in general and Swat in particular. During a FGD, a journalist was of the opinion that:

Women cannot serve as Station House Officer (SHO) or for some other higher cadre because women are fearful, weak and have to raise children.

On the other hand, one candle can often light a thousand as expressed by a male participant in a FGD:

Women can lead a police station not only in Swat but anywhere in the country. They are capable and competent enough of performing their duties in a colossal way and in some situations they can even perform better than policemen...agar auratain mulk chala sakti hain tou police station kiyon nahi chala sakteen (if a woman can run a country, why can't she run a police station as well?)

A Critical Need

One may have mixed views about women in policing, but it can not be denied that their presence is greatly needed not just within the Swat Police Force but also all over Pakistan. During the FGD, some police respondents acknowledged that there should be at least three lady constables in a police station. A member from a religious minority in Landicus remarked that:

*There are no policewomen from minorities.
I don't know why they are not recruited in the police.*

Despite being unaware of women constables in their respective police stations and their traditionalist outlook, community members from the study areas also stressed the need of women police, especially during the conflict. About 80% respondents were of the opinion that women should be recruited in the police and that there should be separate police stations for women:

It would be easy for women to visit the women police station and register their complaints and discuss their issues more openly with the women staff.

-----Woman participant of FGD

The above findings clearly represent dichotomous views and opinions regarding women joining the police force especially since community members are both reluctant to let their own women family

members join given Swat’s more orthodox milieu; as well as due to fears following what the Taliban did to one police constable during the conflict. This also reflects the larger mindset of society where women in the family are considered ‘property’ that needs to be protected from the outside world indicative of the dynamics of power and control, where protection is used as a plea to control women’s life choices and limit their mobility.


However, a large majority of respondents also stressed on the need of having more women in police and in community policing initiatives since they have deeper knowledge about the micro- realities and events taking place in their immediate surroundings. It is imperative that women be supported in their personal and professional choices, but for a woman who wants to join the police (or even the Armed Forces) from a conflict-prone or post-conflict scenario, the level of support needs to be raised much higher. They should not only be provided psychosocial support to deal with a stressful, lonely and often harsh work environment, but should also be given administrative/logistical support like pick and drop, daycare and educational facilities for children.

Different Perceptions about Conflict Resolution Mechanisms

Both formal and informal conflict and dispute resolutions mechanisms exist in Swat. Formal institutions include police and courts, while informal institutions are the *Jirga* (a phrase in Pashto language meaning ‘Council’ that takes decisions by consensus) and local committees (*Islahee or Defense Committees*).

Swat is a Pakhtun-dominated region and the research findings show that a large majority of the respondents prefer the *Jirga* for resolving their disputes. Figure 9 shows that 90% of the respondents from the two rural areas preferred local *Jirgas* for conflict resolution, while 75% respondents from urban areas preferred the local *Jirgas* for conciliation and mediation, with the remaining opting to approach the police.

Figure 9: Preferred Institutions for Conflict Resolution



Source: Field Survey (2014).

In pre-and even post-conflict Swat, the *Jirga* has remained functional and strong (especially in rural areas) because the elders continue to influence local affairs and decisions. However, during the conflict, each and every conflict/dispute was influenced by the Taliban. And now that the conflict is over, police and other security agencies are trying to proclaim their position in resolving issues of the community. Given below are the different perspectives of study respondents regarding conflict resolution mechanisms.

Minorities

Members of religious minority groups from urban and rural areas preferred different institutions for conflict resolution. Those in the rural areas preferred the local *Jirga*, whereas police was the preferred institution in the urban areas:

Our disputes are resolved through negotiations with elders. If a case isn't solved by the Jirga, we refer the case to the committee and if the committee fails then we bring the case to the local police station.

-----A minority respondent from rural Dari

On the other hand, a Christian respondent from urban Landicus shared:

If we face any kind of dispute, we immediately inform the police because police is unbiased and treat us well.

A Sikh respondent from Gumbad Mera said that they had a *Gurdwara* where their elders sit and solve disputes.

Community Women

All the women in the study shared that they had no contribution in resolving disputes nor had any role in reconciliatory activities at the community level. One of the women respondents from Landicus village said,

Women can't do anything. They are suppressed by the male members. If they raise their voice against any issue, the male members of the family (father, brother, husband etc.) get annoyed and put restrictions on their mobility. My brothers have not given me my share of the land. If I file a case against them, they will cut off relations with me or they can even kill me.

According to the research findings, it is considered taboo for a woman to visit the police station or *Jirga* for resolving her issue/dispute.

According to the majority of the women respondents, domestic violence is a common issue they face and it has never been taken seriously. Even informal institutions like *Jirga* and other committees do not consider it a crime. Very few cases of domestic violence are reported to the police. In the post-conflict

Swat, women are more aware of their rights related to police and courts. During the conflict, when they had to leave Swat and moved to other areas, because of their interaction with other communities, they became more aware of their rights and importance of the police and court. Women shared some examples, where they had filed cases against their husbands, brothers and in-laws.

I remember one of my women relatives filed a case against her husband because he used to beat her and also sold her land. This case is still in court for the last 5 years. These types of cases are never solved or resulted in divorce.

---Woman respondent from Landicus

Another respondent said:

A few days ago, a girl's case was resolved by a Jirga. She was married to a man in Mardan and was victim of physical violence by the husband and in-laws. The Jirga called her husband and talked to him. All sort of cases in this village are solved by the elders.

Now when the armed conflict has subsided, we have more options to get our problems solved. We can go to the Army or to the village Jirga. The police is our last option to resolve our issues.

Women from the local religious minorities, however, had different perceptions about formal and informal institutions. Christian women preferred their *Baradri* (the Christian community) for solving minor disputes/conflicts. However, if the nature of a particular issue was serious, they approached the local police station.

Community Men

Majority of the male interviewees preferred approaching their local *Jirga* for the resolution of their disputes and conflicts. In fact, it was pointed out that often even the police would recommend that the matter be taken to the *Jirga*. According to one of the respondents from Dari:

Police tells us that when you face some conflict/issue, hold a Jirga and negotiate, if they fail, then come to us and report the case.

Some male respondents from the two urban areas Landicus and Gumbad Mera preferred to visit the police for conflict resolution.

Earlier, people used to solve their disputes by involving local elders and their family members. But now people also go to the police station to solve their disputes.

The Army was seen as 'proud and harsh' and therefore few approached them for resolving their disputes.

Police - Community Relations

In the interviews and focus group discussions, both the community and police verbalized that they had gone through a very difficult time during the armed conflict. They came to realize their mutually dependent and symbiotic relationship. Therefore, police-community relations are gradually improving in Swat. Respondents also referred to the initiatives taken by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) Government during 2013-2014 to improve policing in the province. These initiatives are helping to depoliticize the police and increase accountability mechanisms. According to the community and police, the serving KP Inspector General of Police (IGP) Mr. Nasir Khan Durrani is playing a key role in these initiatives. The IGP is not only protecting his officers and personnel from political and other external influences, but also showing zero tolerance against any kind of corruption in the police. In addition to these initiatives, he has also provided direct telephone numbers of Additional Inspector General of Police and Deputy Inspector General of Police to junior police officers and personnel for sharing work related complaints. However, the major challenge has been to reduce the fear factor amongst junior police personnel that they would not be ill-treated by her/his seniors in case she/he complains against her/his immediate officer.

A senior police officer shared that the IGP takes strict actions against the police officers and personnel if they are found involved in any malpractice. Around 413 police personnel have been dismissed on his orders due to corruption and abuse of power. A group of professionals (journalists, doctors, NGO representatives) of Swat were of the view that the police had improved their services in the post-conflict situation and bribery had decreased. One of the main reasons for improvement in police behavior was felt to be the training on combat techniques and provision of latest weapons boosting their self-confidence, morale and efficiency.

On the other hand, despite the aforementioned developments, majority of the respondents especially from the community were of the view that there was lot to be done to improve police-community relations in Swat. There was a common perception that the behavior of police with the general public is still very harsh. Police do not listen to their complainants. Many of the respondents shared that it was very difficult to register the First Information Report (FIR) if one did not have reference of any political or influential person or economic standing in society. One of the respondents shared that when the police refused to register the FIR of a theft at his house, he approached a relative working as a journalist and only after pressure from the journalist community did the police register his complaint.

Most of the participants stressed the need to ensure speedy investigation and prosecution processes so that people approach the police for the resolution of their problems rather than taking the law into their own hands. A male respondent shared that undoubtedly people were empathetic about the sacrifices the police had made during the armed conflict, but now that peace had been restored the police seemed to be having more coordination with the Army rather than building a strong link with the local community:

We do not mind being questioned by the local police, but Army investigations are annoying because the Army is not aware of our cultural sensitivities and values as many Army men are not from Swat or KP.

At the same time, this study also found that while people may be fearful or wary of aggressive police attitudes, they, themselves were also not cooperative when the police asked them for help. An interesting finding from this study has also been that the general community felt that the police treat religious minorities better:

Police behavior with the minorities is good, but bad with the local people, especially bad with the street children (mostly Afghani).

The behavior of police towards general public is very poor but with the minorities, women and children, it is better, to some extent.

Minorities and the Police

There were three types of religious minorities i.e. Christians, Sikhs and Hindus residing in the locale of the research study. Three respondents (1 female Christian and 2 male Sikhs) were interviewed. Their perception about the police was entirely different from the majority of the population. The Sikhs shared that:

The police are good. They help us and provide us with support and security. We are thankful to them.

The research study discovered that perceptions about the police also vary between Sikhs and Christians. According to the woman Christian respondent:

The police is never impartial. They always listen to the powerful ones. They are easily bribed. They only register the FIR when you give them money.

She also complained that local police give priority to the Sikh community and felt that the Army was impartial and did not take any external pressure. She also added that police was more responsive to the needs of communities after the conflict and had started to protect their religious places and provide security during religious festivals e.g. Christmas and Easter. This was not happening before the conflict. On the other hand, members of the Sikh community informed that:

We have never faced any discrimination from the police because of our religion. They treat us like they treat other inhabitants of Swat.

It was observed during interviews that minorities were reluctant to talk about their reservations about police and tried to give the impression that they had no major issues and complaints against them.

Representation of religious minorities in police is also very low. There is only one Sikh working in Swat police and that too as a head clerk.

When asked about the reason for not joining the police force, the Sikh participants of the study remarked:

Police life is very tough, our community does not like field jobs, we usually prefer business, medical field and teaching jobs. There are no restrictions and hindrances for us to join police department.

As per law, there should be at least 1% minority representatives in each and every government institution, but unfortunately this is not the case.

Women and the Police

95% of women respondents had a negative image of the police in their minds and labeled them as cruel and corrupt. According to them, the police:

- use threats to wrest money from the families of those who are in custody;
- demand money to register genuine FIRs;
- receive bribes to register fabricated complaints and not arrest actual perpetrators.

Police never file your complaint unless and until you give them money. They always ask for bribe.

But it must be pointed out that of the 12 women respondents, only one had come in direct contact with the police and her opinion about them was completely different:

I have been to a police station about 7-8 times to lodge complaint against my husband as he is a drug addict. They never asked for bribe, they were really good to me.

About 60% of the women believed that the behavior of the police is still much better with them than men. However, it is quite rare that a woman would go to a police station alone.

Figure 10: Perceptions about the Police




Figure 10 indicates that 85% of the male and 90% of the women respondents’ perception about the police was not good. 8% women and 50% male respondents were those who have had direct interaction with the police. This perception changed dramatically during the conflict. 60% male and 100% women respondents had sympathies with the police during the conflict.

Men and the Police

According to male respondents, serious attitudinal problems, poor case management and use of outmoded investigation techniques are elements police is known for in Swat. According to them, Swat police stations represent the typical ‘*thana culture*’ which includes aggressive behavior, embezzlement, nepotism, and harsh attitudes towards deprived groups of society. Unlawful search and illegal detention are also common.

The behavior of the police towards general public is very poor, especially towards males. Police do not listen to their complaints and often humiliate them. Women and children to some extent get good response from police as this is the local norm to give respect to women and children.

----Respondent from Landicus

About 80% of the male respondents were not happy with the behavior of the police. The rest thought that the police, too, have some limitations:

Police have very limited resources and still they are providing us security. Although police is overburdened with lots of responsibilities, it should not be an excuse of their bad behavior and attitude with the local people.

---- Respondent from Gumbad Mera



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Section III: Recommendations

Recommendations

An efficient, politically neutral, equipped, well-trained and well-paid civilian police service is critical for any counter insurgency and counter-terrorism effort in Pakistan (Abbas 2011). Experiences around the world provide evidence that countries that have invested adequately and timely in the police institution, whether under normal/peaceful circumstances, conflict or post conflict scenario, these were able to maintain the law and order situation and earned the confidence and respect of the community. From the comprehensive research findings, the following set of recommendations are being submitted:

1. Political leadership
2. Police leadership
3. Community

Political Leadership

- The law enforcement infrastructure in Pakistan is outmoded and there is a need for new laws and major revisions in the prevailing laws. International funds for counter-terrorism are mainly directed to the country's military, while funding for the police force mostly remains inadequate.
- During this research study, it was found that there is lack of coordination among law enforcement agencies especially between the police, the Army and intelligence agencies. There is a need to establish strong coordination between all these stakeholders. Also, recruitment and training standards for police in Pakistan are not up to the mark so they need a major overhaul both at institutional and policy level. A thorough and efficient mechanism should be put in place to gauge the credibility of policemen/women at the time of their induction.
- Representation of women in police is very low, especially in Swat. There is a need to take immediate action in order to raise the current number of women in police.
- The police force in Swat has certain needs and expectations from the government as well as community which should be given priority. For example, the salaries of police are very low and very hard to meet their domestic expenditures and needs. Like one participant commented, '*Agar police corruption karti hay ya rishwat leti hay tu uss ke bunyadi waja thori tankhua hay (if police engages in corruption or taking bribe, the basic reason behind this is that they have very low salaries).*'
- Latest weapons, equipment and gadgets like computers, forensic equipment etc. should be provided. More vehicles and motorbikes based on population figures under police jurisdiction should be provided. Currently, there is only one or two vehicles at a police station: one for operations while the other one for investigation. The vehicles are insufficient for bringing prisoners to the courts, escorting VIPs, patrolling and investigation.
- Crime scene investigation with the help of latest investigation techniques and tools is required. A forensic lab should be established in Swat to expedite the process of investigation. Police

barracks need to be improved, especially in rural areas. The police stations of Swat have either been renovated or newly built, but the barracks of many police stations are not comfortable to live in and are not well-protected against terrorism. This aspect should be taken care of so that the police personnel can perform their duty with peace of mind. Health and education facilities for the families of junior cadres must be given a priority as this will help to raise the morale and confidence of police.

- Complete de-politicization of police so that police officers and personnel can be freed of the pressure from ministers, MNAs/MPAs, community influential/s and religious leaders.

Police Leadership


- There is a need to deal systematically with the traumatic effects of policing during the conflict and even in the post conflict scenario on police men and women's professional and personal lives. Counseling should be provided to overcome the feelings of fear and uncertainty. Training programs to deal with different kind of stressors should be a regular feature.
- Community-police relations is an area which needs substantial improvement. During the research, complaints about poor behavior of police were commonly heard. There is a lack of coordination between the local community and the police. Women are afraid of going to police stations even if they have a genuine and legal complaint. The module on Community Policing should be tailored according to the needs of policing in post-conflicts setting. A portion of police budget must be devoted to implementation of community policing programs. Performance evaluation system of police from officer to staff level should be strengthened and community policing initiatives must be given weightage. There is a need to develop a community outreach strategy. Community outreach officers should be appointed at police station level to bridge the gap between police and community. SHO of local police station should arrange monthly meetings with community and should listen to their problems. Special measures should be taken for meaningful involvement of women and religious minorities in the community policing processes.
- Short courses on pro-women legislation should be introduced. There is a need for training and information and education material development for police on the issue of Child Sexual Abuse (CSA).
- Police Station, which is the most important pillar of policing, should be the center of police reforms initiatives. Availability of financial resources at a police station for operations and investigation is a must; otherwise, police would either pay the expenses incurred on various operations and investigation related items from their own pockets or by the complainants. The Police Rules of 1934 has a clause which allows management of the police to send in advance the average expenses of each police station, but this clause is not implemented on the ground while the reimbursement of monthly expenditure is a very lengthy and time consuming exercise so the police tends to ask complainants for bearing these expenses, as shared by many respondents.

- Police should continue protection of minorities e.g. proactive actions for securing their places of worship and religious events. Representation of minorities should be increased in the police department. Special measures are required to end the feelings of religious minorities that they are lesser Pakistanis. All minority groups should be dealt equitably and fairly.
- Training on firing weapons for women police is also a need. This is evident from the responses of the community representatives that unfortunately the community as well as the police does not consider women fit for performing normal policing functions. One lady constable shared that at times she accompanies police parties on risky raids where the opponents/criminals fire on the police, but she had no weapon to protect herself. Infact many policemen highlighted the need of refresher courses for them on firing weapons twice a year. Training of Special Police Force's (SPF's) men and women personnel on attitudinal change and police laws is a must so that they can carry out their job more effectively.
- For immediate action, recruit and train a special cadre of women who can serve on leadership positions in regular policing. In the long run, measures should be taken to mainstream role of women in hardcore policing.
- Women working in police reported prevalence of harassment, discrimination and stereotypical attitudes of their male colleagues. This challenge should be addressed through administrative actions and gender sensitization training programs. Training programs are arranged to provide police men and women an opportunity to understand the challenges and opportunities of working in mix gender teams.
- There is a need to pay immediate attention to improve working conditions of women in police. This includes, but not limited to, pick and drop facility, separate washroom, day care facility, and specified duty hours. Enhance the role of women in policing and not limit them to a secondary and facilitating role. Appoint women as SHOs and at other senior positions. Take actions if they lack in any training. Special drives should be organized to motivate women to join the police force by highlighting them as role models.
- Establish helpline or SMS service where women can report their issues easily without having confidentiality concerns and prompt action must be taken on these complaints.

Community

- In the post conflict scenario, there is a great potential to build on the realization and acknowledgement found in the police and community about the importance of each others' role in effective policing. While the community needs to understand police limitations, they should hold them accountable if they do not deliver. They should play a more proactive role and engage through civil society groups to improve policing in their respective areas.
- Challenge the stereotypes and myths about women police. Collaborate with police leadership to enhance the role of women in policing.
- Cooperate with the police if it takes any action as per the law.





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Annexure-I

Introduction of Research Partners

There were three partners that carried out the research-study: Rozan, HUIRA and COMSATS-CIIT, Abbottabad. The former two are devolvement sector, non-government organizations, while the latter is an academic and research based institution. Rozan as the lead organization selected the two partners based on their areas of expertise.

Rozan

Rozan is an Islamabad based, non-government and not for profit organization established in December, 1998. Focus areas of Rozan's work are emotional health, gender, violence against women, children and youth. In 2006, Rozan acquired the prestigious special consultative status with the United Nation's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

Rozan's mission is 'to work with all people, especially women, children and youth; to collectively strive for a society which is violence free, self-aware and accepting of itself and others'.

Rozan's origin came about through a realization of the impact of violence on individuals and society, a motivation to overcome it, and a belief in the potential of all people to improve their lives.

Rozan programs:

Aangan - Children and Youth's programme, works as a resource centre on the emotional health of children and youth, focusing on child sexual abuse.

Zeest - Women's programme, works on the emotional health of women focusing on issues of gender and violence against women (VAW).

Humqadam - Men's programme conducts research on masculinities and works with men and boys in the community to mobilize them to address VAW.

Rozan Helpline - Offers counseling through telephone, in person, e-mail and counseling camps for children, youth and women.

Munsalik - Media and Advocacy unit - coordinates the advocacy activities of programs and seeks media support and sensitization on Rozan issues.

Rabta - Police Program is one of Rozan's programs, working with police, since 1999 at federal and provincial levels. It is known for capacity building of police on issues like self-awareness, gender sensitization, violence against women and children and behavioral change communication. Rozan has been working with the police through a formal partnership/Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with National Police Academy and Islamabad Territory Police. Rabta's most important milestones have been the development of training modules on "Attitudinal Change" and "Interviewing Women and Children Survivors/Victims of Violence". These modules were approved by the NPA to be taught as part of

regular police training curricula in Pakistan. Rabta has also been conducting trainings for Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASsP) under training and stress management courses with senior ranks of law enforcement agencies in Pakistan at the NPA.

At present, Rabta-Police Program is working on police reforms by focusing on introducing new laws that govern the police. Rozan in collaboration with other like-minded organizations, has developed the draft Sindh Police Bill 2014 which is being advocated to be tabled in the Sindh Provincial Assembly.

COMSATS CIIT–Institute of Information Technology, Abbottabad

COMSATS CIIT is one of the leading universities in Pakistan. It is firmly committed to making higher education an important force in fighting poverty and social injustice in the country through quality education, research and social action. CIIT has been very active in applied research and training in the 2005 post-earthquake situation. The CIIT has hosted several round-table dialogues with policymakers and other stakeholders on the situation in Swat since 2011. It played an important role in supporting, both financially and psychologically, the internally displaced person (IDPs) from Swat. CIIT is Noragric's main university partner in Pakistan through Research Council of Norway's program; *Gender, Human Security and Development in Post Conflict Pakistan*.

HUJRA-Village Support Organization

HUJRA is a non-profit, non-political, non-ethnic and development oriented local organization based in Swat and working in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and FATA. HUJRA was established in 1997 and registered under the Societies Registration Act of 1860. The main thematic areas of HUJRA are eradication of poverty; gender mainstreaming; education; health; agriculture; disaster management and conservation of natural resources. Being a local organization, HUJRA played an important role in the pre and post conflict situation supporting local communities. HUJRA joined hands with international humanitarian aid agencies and government in emergency relief response to the conflict and flood affected people. Apart from early recovery, rehabilitation and development projects, HUJRA is currently engaged with COMSATS Institute of Information Technology, Abbottabad and Norwegian University of Life Sciences in facilitating research on *Gender, Human Security and Development in Post Conflict Pakistan (NMBU)*

Research Technical Committee (TC) and Its Role

A Technical Committee (TC) was formed, in consultation with the partner organizations, to support the core team of researchers in enhancing the quality and validity of this research. It was a voluntary committee comprised of research experts, gender specialists, academic professionals and a senior police officer. It was decided that the TC would guide and support the research process at the following three stages:

- Research kick off: feedback on research framework (objectives, design, tools, methodology)
- Data collection: review and fine tuning the data collection process
- Finalization of research findings and report.

TC Members

1. Dr. Saba Gul Khattak, Researcher
2. Mr. Ehsan Sadiq, DIG Police
3. Ms. Kishwar Sultana, Director , Insan Foundation Trust, Islamabad
4. Dr. Bahadar Nawab Khan, Associate Professor, COMSATS-CIIT, Abbottabad
5. Mr. Saleem Ahmed, Executive Director-HUJRA, Swat
6. Dr. Ambreen Ahmad, Advisor-Rozan
7. Mr. Babar Bashir, Managing Director-Rozan
8. Mr. Saffiullah, Researcher/Program Coordinator, (Humqadam) Men and Boys' Program-Rozan
9. Sayyed Safi Peerzada, Program Coordinator, (Rabta) Police Program-Rozan

Annexure – II:

Question Guides for Data Collection

1 - Question Guide for the Local Community Women

Date:

Place:

Interviewer:

A - General Questions related to the research:

1. What are main conflicts/issues regarding women in the area?
2. How do you define violence?
3. What is violence against women?
4. How are the women-related issues of violence resolved?
5. How do women contribute to resolve these issues?
6. Violence is a personal matter of a women. Do you agree with this?
7. Women are responsible for the violence against them. Do you agree with this?
8. Are there any laws to protect the rights of women?

B - Policing pre, post and during the conflict in Swat and violence against women issues

9. Do you think that domestic violence is a problem of Swat?
10. Do you see any change in the nature of violence against women (VAW) related issues (physical, emotional/psychological, sexual, economic violence) in pre, during and post-conflict situation? What are the main issues regarding women in the village in post-conflict scenario? (pre, post and during conflict)
11. Have the local communities' sympathies with police enhanced or reduced in post conflict scenario? If yes how?
12. What kinds of security practices did police engage to resolve the issues of VAW in before and after the conflict?
13. How did the Talibanization affect the lives of women (socially, physically, and psychologically)?

- Are these issues solved by police or any other institutions (Army, lashkar, defense committee, peace committee) are they involved in their management?

C - Violence against Children:

14. What are children related issues (protection) in the area? How are they solved by police or any other institution.
15. Are there cases of violence against children. If yes, what is the nature of these cases?
16. Are there cases of child sexual abuse in the area? If yes, how are these cases dealt with? Are these cases taken to police?
17. Children are not abused by their acquaintances in most of the cases. Is this true?

D - Minorities Issues:

18. What are the specific vulnerabilities of minorities?
19. How does police treat minorities?

E - Community-Police Relationship:

20. How is the relationship between police and community?
21. Are there any gaps between community and police?
22. Do police stay impartial of political, ethnical, religious and social issues when dealing with local communities particularly women and children?
23. Have you ever visited a Police Station or interacted with the police directly?
24. How's the behavior of the police towards women?
25. What should be the educational and training attainment of the women and men police?
26. Is there any confrontation between the police and local culture (code of conduct)?
27. What actions should be taken to make the police-community relationship better, especially to sensitively deal with the cases of violence against women and children?
28. How has the relationship and level of trust between the community, especially with women, and the police/women police developed and changed with time?
 - What different kinds of policing practices in pre and during conflict scenarios?
 - Are there any changes in post-conflict scenario?
 - Has this changed over the past 20 – 30 years? In what ways?

F - Women in Police:

29. What types of women-related issues are brought to Police Stations? What is the process to deal with these cases? Did you deal any case of VAW?
30. Do you feel the need of the women police for community?
31. Do women police have any influence in the village? Directly? Indirectly? Explain.
32. What is your opinion about women police in dealing with the issues of women, children and minorities?
33. Are there any women in police in the village? If not, why not? If so, what are their roles and responsibility?
34. What was local community perception regarding women police? Has there been any change after the conflict? Do the relatives of women police have reservations?
35. What was the role of the women police during the conflict?
36. To what scale women were affected and vulnerable during the conflict? During displacement? During return? Explain.
37. What do you think about women representation/not representation in the defense committee or Jirga to address the different types of women oriented crimes? If not so, should women be given a role in Jirgas?

2 - Question Guide for the Local Minorities

Date:

Place:

Interviewer:

A - General questions for respondent's profiling:

Respondents:

1. (a) What are the main conflicts/issues in the village regarding minorities? Who are involved?
(b) What are the reasons for the conflicts/issues?
2. In case of the conflict which institution/department you prefer to inform, police, Army, church/ temple or any other? Why?

B - Issues based questioning

3. How has the conflict affected the (social, physical, psychological & economic) lives of minorities?
4. Do the police treat different groups of minorities differently, if yes, which groups of minorities (Christians, Sikhs, transgenders etc.) and why?
5. Are the local minorities migrating from Swat, if yes, why?
 - a) What are the specific vulnerabilities of minorities in Swat?
 - (b) Is there any biasness in police attitude towards minorities? If yes, what?
 - (c) How's the behavior of the police towards minority women/ children?
6. Do police provide security for your religious places and festivals? If yes, how? (Elaborate this word "how")
7. Can women and men from minorities join the police? If not so, what are the challenges for them?
8. How do you compare your safety and security before, during and after the conflict?

C- Role of police

9. What is the role of police in promoting and upholding rights of minorities (Proactive Action)?
10. Do you get the required support from the police for your safety and security in post-conflict scenario?
11. Did you get any assistance from police during conflict and displacement and for resettlement?

D - Police-minority relationship

12. How has the relationship and level of trust between the minorities and the police developed and changed with time?
13. What are the hindrances and supporting factors in the post-conflict scenario for the minorities-police relationship?
14. What do minorities think of police? Who are the police is accountable to?
15. Is there any representation of minorities in the police department? If not why?
16. To what extent do think the police is accountable to the local minorities? Where do you register your complaints against the police?
17. Are there any conflicts between minorities and police? What are the kinds of conflicts?
18. What actions should be taken to make the police-minorities relationship better?

E - Women in Policing

19. What was local community perception regarding women police?
20. Are there any women's police from minority? If not, why not? If so, what are their roles and responsibilities?
21. What was the role of the women police during the conflict?

F - Issues related to Violence against Women, Children and Minorities:

22. How do you define violence?
23. What are different types of violence against women in Swat? Is there any change pre, during and post conflict scenario? What are these changes?
24. What types of women-related issues are brought to Police Stations? What is process to deal these cases? Did you deal any case of VAW? How did you deal?
25. "Domestic violence is a private matter and no one should intervene into it" what do you think?
26. What do you think of women who take their cases to police station, especially the cases of domestic violence?
27. Are there any laws to protect women's rights and to curb violence against them? If yes, what are the laws for protecting?

28. What are different types of violence against children in Swat? Is there any change in pre, during and post conflict scenario? What are these changes?
29. What types of children-related cases are brought to Police Stations? What is process to deal these cases? Did you deal any case of violence against children? What was the case and how did you deal with it?
30. What are different minorities (religious, ethnic) in Swat? What are the specific vulnerabilities of minorities? Is there any change in their vulnerabilities in pre, during and post conflict scenario? What are these changes?
31. What kinds of cases are registered against or by minorities? Did you deal any case of minorities? What was the case and how did you deal with it?
32. Are there any laws for the protection of minorities? What are they?

3 - Question Guide for the Police

Date:

Place:

Interviewer:

A - General questions for respondents' profiling:

Respondents:

- What is your name?
- What is your age?
- What is your educational qualification?
- What is your Designation?
- In which Police Station are you posted?

B - Generic Questions on Policing

1. What made you decide to join the police?
2. How were you recruited?
3. What kind of crime do you usually deal with? Has this changed over the last 5 years? (get specific examples, and try to capture what they define as crime).
4. How do you address the different types of crime?
5. What are the reasons of lack trust in police by the general public?
6. What are the expectations of the police from the government in post conflict situation?
7. Is there any confrontation between Pukhtoonwali and police?
8. Do police have enough resources to manage the future conflicts on their own?
9. Who are the stakeholders for managing law and order in Swat? Do you feel a gap between police and other stakeholders (army, defense committee, community) in coordination?
10. Do you feel stressed out while working in Police service? If yes, what type of stress do you feel?
11. What are the different mechanisms which you adopt to cope with stress?

C - Policing pre and post conflict situation in swat:

12. What kinds of conflicts are there in Swat?
13. What was the scenario when the Taliban took over Swat?
14. How has the Talibanization affected the police in Swat?

15. How did you respond to the threats by Taliban?
16. Compare your role, responsibilities and activities pre, during and post-conflict scenario?
17. What kind of new trainings and skills do you need to meet the expectation of the local community? What are lacking in police's skills?
18. What additional trainings you need to confront the new security challenges to police?
19. What are the hurdles on getting required training and skills from the government?
20. Did conflict bring any change in your role and responsibilities? How and what types of changes?
21. How did the government assist you during and after the conflict?
22. What were the insecurities to security personnel during and after the conflict? how has the conflict affected the professional and personal life of police? (Pre-, post , during)

D - Community-Police Relationship:

23. How has the relationship and level of trust between the community and the police developed and changed (pre, during and post) with time?
24. Do the communities have sympathies with police in post conflict scenario? If yes, how?
25. What are the formal and informal (ADRs) existing in the aftermath of the conflict? How do they function, what is their composition, what cases to does each system take up?
26. What are the needs of the police after the conflict?
27. Do police get any training to cope with any kind of conflict? If yes what kind of the training? And to what extent that training was useful during the conflict?
28. To what extent are the police accountable to the local community? Can the community, and have they, waged complaints on police conduct? What was it, solved or ongoing?
29. Is the police aware of the vulnerabilities of the NGOs? If yes, how are they solved?
30. What role should NGO sector play to boost policing?

E - Issues related to Violence against Women, Children and Minorities:

31. How do you define violence?
32. What are different types of violence against women in Swat? Is there any change pre, during and post conflict scenario? What are these changes?

33. What types of women-related issues are brought to Police Stations? What is process to deal these cases? Did you deal any case of VAW? How did you deal?
34. “Domestic violence is a private matter and no one should intervene into it” what do you think?
35. What do you think of women who take their cases to police station, especially the cases of domestic violence?
36. Are there any laws to protect women’s rights and to curb violence against them? If yes, what are the laws for protecting?
37. What are different types of violence against children in Swat? Is there any change in pre, during and post conflict scenario? What are these changes?
38. What types of children-related cases are brought to Police Stations? What is process to deal these cases? Did you deal any case of violence against children? What was the case and how did you deal with it?
39. What are different minorities (religious, ethnic) in Swat? What are the specific vulnerabilities of minorities? Is there any change in their vulnerabilities in pre, during and post conflict scenario? What are these changes?
40. What kinds of cases are registered against or by minorities? Did you deal any case of minorities? What was the case and how did you deal with it?
41. Are there any laws for the protection of minorities? What are they?

F - Women in policing:

42. Are there any women police in Swat? How many and at what ranks
43. Do you feel the need of women police for community? If so, what is it, and if not, why not?
44. What are the major personal, social and professional constraints for you being in a police woman?
45. How women police play their role during and after the conflict?
46. How women police affected during and after the conflict?
47. What kinds issues do women face of trainings is given to women police to protect the community?
48. Is the working environment of police is conducive for women officers/personnel? If not what should be done to facilitate women police officers/personnel?
49. How did you respond to the conflict?

50. Are there women police officers in decision making positions? If yes, how many? If not so, why?
Can women lead the police, especially in Swat? What's your opinion about women police?

51. Can women lead/run a police station?

4 - Question Guide for the Local Community Men

Date:

Place:

Interviewer:

A - General questions for respondents' profiling:

Respondents:

- What is your name?
- What is your educational background?
- What's your profession?

B - Generic Information

1. What are the main conflicts in the village? Who are involved in them? What are the reasons for conflicts?
2. How did the conflict affect the (social, economic, physical and psychological) lives of the people?
3. What are your safety and security related issues in the area?
4. Do police exist in your village? If no, how far is the police station and how you approach there?
5. How are the conflicts solved, by police or any other institution?
6. What do people think of police? Who are they accountable to?
7. what skill and training is lacking in the police men and officials?
8. How are they recruited? How are they trained and what are their responsibilities?
9. How's the behavior of the police towards the general public, especially with women, children and minorities?
10. What is the legal role of the police in the village? What is included in police's jurisdiction?
11. Is there any confrontation between local culture and police? If yes, what is it?

C - Women in Policing:

12. Is there any women's police station in the village? If not, why not? If so, what are their roles and responsibilities?
13. Do you feel the need of the women to be recruited in police?
14. Do women police have any influence in the village? Directly? Indirectly? Explain

15. What was local community's perception regarding women police? Is there any change in the role of women police after the conflict?
16. Has your family any reservations for your joining in Police? (Specific to Women)

D - Community Policing:

17. How has the relationship and level of trust between the community and the police developed and changed with time?
18. What are the obstacles/hindrances and supporting factors in the village post-conflict scenario for the community and police both.
19. What actions should be taken to make the police-community relationship better?
20. In case of the conflict which institution you prefer to inform police, Army or any other? Why?
21. Are there any conflicts between community and police? What are the kinds of conflicts?
22. Do the community have sympathies with police in post-conflict scenario?if yes how if no why?
23. To what extent are the police accountable to the local community? Can the community wage complaints against the police's misconduct?
24. Do police stay impartial of political, religious, ethnical and social issues when dealing with the local communities?

E - Policing in Pre, during and Post Conflict Situations in Swat:

25. What kinds of security practices did police engage in before and after the conflict?
26. What was the role of the women police during the conflict? Whom they assisted (children, women, men)?
27. Do you feel a gap in coordination between police and other stakeholders (Army, jirga, community)?
28. What do you think how do police see their own role after the conflict?

F - Issues related to Violence against Women, Children and Minorities:

29. How do you define violence?
30. What are different types of violence against women in Swat? Is there any change pre, during and post conflict scenario? What are these changes?
31. What types of women-related issues are brought to Police Stations? What is process to deal these cases?

32. “Domestic violence is a private matter and no one should intervene into it” what do you think?
33. What do you think of women who take their cases to police station, especially the cases of domestic violence? How truthful they are? What kind of legal support they get?
34. Are there any laws to protect women’s rights and to curb violence against them? If yes, what are the laws for protecting?
35. What are different types of violence against children in Swat? Is there any change in pre, during and post conflict scenario? What are these changes?
36. What types of children-related cases are brought to Police Stations? What is process to deal these cases?
37. What are different minorities (religious, ethnic) in Swat? What are the specific vulnerabilities of minorities? Is there any change in their vulnerabilities in pre, during and post conflict scenario? What are these changes?
38. What kinds of cases are registered against or by minorities?
39. Are there any laws for the protection of minorities? What are they?
40. How does police treat minorities?
41. Can violence against women be justified? If yes, how? If no, how?

Annexure – III:

Picture Gallery



Planning meeting of Technical Committee
at Rozan Islamabad



FGD with Policemen from across Swat



Pre-data collection planning meeting at
HUIRA Swat



In-depth interviews with community men



FGD with community intellectuals



FGD with Policemen from across Swat



In- depth interview with a minority representative



FGD with Policemen from across Swat



FGD with Policemen from across Swat



In-depth interview with a police officer at Police Station Kabal



Pre-printing data sharing meeting in Swat



FGD with media representatives



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